ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Executive pay in U.S. public companies is controversial.' Reformers say it is excessive and set by captured boards, 2 while supporters say it reflects a well-functioning market. 3 Some legal academics say it creates perverse and even dangerous incentives, 4 while some fi-ers. During 2012, the second year of say-on-pay under Dodd-Frank, we find similar patterns, with companies responding proactively when the company comes onto shareholders' radar screens because of an unfavorable ISS recommendation or an earlier poor, or failed, say-onpay vote in 2011. We use four case studies to illustrate this new dynamic.
In all, our findings suggest that the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay mandate has not broadly unleashed shareholder opposition to executive pay at U.S. companies, as some proponents had hoped for. Nonetheless, it has affected pay practices at outlier companies experiencing weak performance and high executive pay levels that are identified by proxy advisory firms like ISS. In addition, mandatory say-on-pay seems to have encouraged management to be more responsive to shareholder concerns about executive pay and corporate governance. 9 This shift in management-shareholder relations may be the most important consequence of Dodd-Frank thus far.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay legislation and the SEC's implementation of the DoddFrank Act, as well as the academic debate over say-on-pay. Part II contains our empirical analysis of the 2011 say-on-pay voting results, looking at both univariate and multivariate results that demonstrate the importance of ISS voting recommendations along with several other firm-specific variables, including total shareholder return, "excess" pay levels, and CEO pay growth rates. Part III examines the aftermath of say-on-pay during the 2011 proxy season and the preliminary 2012 say-on-pay voting results, which show more negative ISS voting recommendations and more companies with failed votes than at the same point in the 2011 proxy voting season. We find management at these and other companies exhibiting a more proactive attitude toward say-on-pay votes and undertaking greater engagement with shareholders. We offer four case studies as examples of the strategies that companies have adopted in response to negative ISS voting recommendations. Finally, we conclude with several observations about how the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay mandate has and may continue to shape U.S. corporate governance.
9 See id., at 1256-57 (discussing examples of management responding to shareholder concerns by making "changes to the substance and disclosure of their pay programs").
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I. SAY-ON-PAY IN THE UNITED STATES
The idea of say-on-pay began in the United Kingdom in 2002 and spread to the United States in 2006 as a fledgling movement by activist shareholders. 10 The financial crisis of 2008 bolstered these activists, as Congress sought to address perceived problems in our corporate governance system, including executive pay." Dodd-Frank included among its many changes a mandate that all public companies give their shareholders an advisory vote on the company's actual pay practices.1 2 Before and since Dodd-Frank, academics have debated the merits of say-on-pay. In this Section, we describe this academic debate and the predictions about say-on-pay before its enactment; we then lay out the background of the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay regime.
A. The Say-on-Pay Debate
Even before Dodd-Frank imposed its say-on-pay mandate, academics actively debated the merits of federally requiring a shareholder vote on executive pay. 13 This say-on-pay debate rehashed the question of whether mandatory corporate law, particularly at the federal level, should displace enabling state law. Those arguing for a sayon-pay mandate viewed a uniform federal standard across all public companies to be preferable to a voluntary company-by-company approach that had already begun with shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8.1 4
Arguments for Say-on-Pay
Proponents of mandatory say-on-pay pointed to the U.K., which in 2002 "became the first country to adopt requirements for shareholder votes on [executive] pay." 15 The legislation required U.K. incorporated companies "listed on major U.K. or foreign stock exchanges" to submit "an executive remuneration report" annually to shareholders and to "submit such report to a nonbinding shareholder vote at the annual meeting." 1 6 The U.K. say-on-pay mandate sought to address "concerns among the public and institutional investors regarding excessive executive pay." 17 Soon after, in 2004, Australia and the Netherlands also adopted say-on-pay reforms. 18 The Dutch law calls for "a binding, rather than a merely an [sic] advisory" one, but the vote does not necessarily happen annually and "the shareholders vote on compensation policies, not on a retrospective report."I 9 Then, "Sweden in 2006 and Norway in 2007 both enacted legislation similar to the Dutch model, requiring a binding shareholder vote on compensation policies." 20 Academic studies looking at the U.K. experience with say-on-pay have generally painted a favorable picture, though with results less dramatic than some expected. Sudhakar Balachandran, Fabrizio Ferri, and David Maber compared U.K. pay practices before and after the U.K. say-on-pay mandate, and concluded that the new rule had increased pay-for-performance sensitivity at U.K. companies. 21 Another study by Ferri and Maber, looking at the impact of the U.K. legislation on stock prices for companies with high executive pay and the voting results under the U.K. say-on-pay regime, found that shareholders reacted favorably to the legislation and later to specific pay reforms at companies receiving negative votes on their pay practices. 22 Professors Ferri and Maber concluded:
We document a positive market reaction to the announcement of say on pay regulation for firms with controversial CEO pay practices and, more specifically, weak penalties for poor performance, consistent with shareholders perceiving say on pay as a value enhancing monitoring mechanism. We also find that firms respond to high voting dissent by removing controversial provisions criticized as rewards for failure, Besides pointing to the U.K. experience, academic proponents of mandatory say-on-pay for U.S. companies argued that more transparency and accountability would lead to greater efficiency and social responsiveness. 24 They also argued that say-on-pay would help boards negotiate pay packages with CEOs more effectively on behalf of shareholders. 25 Further, the say-on-pay proponents assumed that shareholders would be able to identify companies with poorly designed pay packages and vote against them.
26
Proponents of say-on-pay also asserted that the ISS and the other proxy advisory firms would help inform shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, so that they could coordinate their monitoring of management and thus reduce managerial agency costs. 27 They argued that ISS and other proxy voting advisors created and periodically revised their voting guidelines on say-on-pay, and that this would foster institutional shareholder activism and help institutional clients fulfill their fiduciary duties to exercise portfolio share votes effectively. 28 monitoring. 29 Proponents argued that the ISS would monitor company pay practices and formulate voting advice to shareholders, both to paying clients and others who use the publicly available ISS voting recommendations. 30 In addition, proponents of say-on-pay anticipated that the ISS would serve as representative for shareholder voting interests, with company management negotiating directly with the ISS to obtain a favorable voting recommendation or to reverse an unfavorable one. 31 Some proponents further predicted that a mandatory shareholder say-on-pay vote would dampen the spiral in executive pay 32 and "deter some egregious compensation arrangements." 3 3 Others anticipated that a say-on-pay vote would strengthen the relationship between pay and performance, thus reducing payment for failure. 3 4 For example, in written testimony before Congress, Professor Lucian Bebchuk urged that shareholders receive an advisory vote on executive pay at U.S. companies, concluding that such a vote would allow shareholders to express their views when pay was not connected to company performance. 35 
Arguments Against Say-on-Pay
Skeptics of say-on-pay asserted that a federally mandated shareholder vote on executive pay (whether advisory or binding) would upset the balance of authority between the corporate board and ISS, which operates on a limited budget). A mandatory say-on-pay vote would be superfluous because, under the existing allocation of shareholder and board powers, shareholders could already express their concerns about executive pay-through direct dialogue with management, the casting of "no" or "withhold" votes against directors sitting on underperforming compensation committees, or the approval of shareholder resolutions seeking individual company say-on-pay votes. Academic opponents asserted that a mandatory say-on-pay vote would create few benefits, as shareholders could already use Rule 14a-8 to propose such a vote, and a mandatory vote was certain to produce additional costs. Some critics questioned whether shareholders would be able to identify differences in pay plans, potentially leading to uninformed say-on-pay votes. Other critics predicted that some shareholders would use say-on-pay to advance their political agendas. 41 Professor Jeffrey Gordon doubted that U.S. shareholders would be interested in say-on-pay, pointing to the U.K experience where shareholders had overwhelmingly approved pay packages put to a vote, with only eight negative votes in the first six years of U.K. sayon-pay. 42 Moreover, Gordon pointed out that overall shareholder support in the United States for shareholder proposals seeking company-by-company say-on-pay votes had leveled off at about forty-two percent, suggesting that most shareholders were not taken by the concept. 43 He concluded that adopting say-on-pay to "better link pay and performance" in the United States would be a "dubious choice."44
Other skeptics of say-on-pay argued that a mandatory regime would only increase the influence of proxy advisory firms, whose purportedly one-size-fits-all voting recommendations would be followed blindly by institutional shareholders.45 Some argued that management would thus become controlled by ISS-led shareholders, undermining management's discretionary authority. 46 The critics also stated their concerns that ISS voting recommendations could be biased, since the firm both provides voting advice on pay packages and consults with companies on adopting pay policies. 47 Some critics of say-on-pay questioned whether pay reform is necessary, asserting that pay and performance at public companies are linked. 4 Yet others doubted that say-on-pay would affect pay practices and corporate governance in the ways envisioned by its proponents.
50
In a 2001 analysis of the say-on-pay concept, which was prescient in anticipating the reform movement for a shareholder role in executive pay, Professors Brian Cheffins and Randall Thomas concluded that say-on-pay would probably be used sparingly by U.S. shareholders to vote down pay packages that deviated "far from the norm." 51 They predicted that say-on-pay votes would probably not stifle the upward spiral in executive pay.
52
B. Dodd-Frank's Say-on-Pay Mandate and SEC Implementation
The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that shareholders in public companies be given a "yes" or "no" advisory vote on the pay of the company's top named executives during the prior fiscal year. 5 3 DoddFrank also requires that such shareholders be given an advisory vote on the frequency of their say-on-pay vote and on any "golden parachute" payments made in any acquisition or merger. 54 The votes, however, do not bind the directors or alter directors' duties to shareholders. 55 Thus, Dodd-Frank specifies that any shareholder vote should not be construed to overrule any decision by the company or its board, or to imply any additional fiduciary duties for directors or officers.
56
As added by Dodd-Frank, the new Section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act requires that management present "a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives," though the vote "shall not be binding on the issuer or the The SEC has implemented the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay mandate to specify the form of the say-on-pay proposal on which shareholders are to vote and the executive officers whose pay is subject to the shareholder vote. For public companies with more than a $75 million public equity float, the SEC required say-on-pay votes at shareholder meetings held after January 20, 2011.59 The say-on-pay vote applies only to the company's CEO and the four other named executive officers included in the compensation table required in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis ("CD&A") section of the company's proxy statement. 60 Shareholders are given a "for" or "against" vote on the company's overall executive pay package, but do not vote on the pay of specific officers or specific elements of pay (such as bonuses, stock options, retirement pay, and performance incentives). 61 The SEC rules also required companies to disclose on Form 8-K the results of the say-on-pay vote within four business days of the 61 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a). In addition, the SEC added a comment to Rule 14a-8 that companies will be allowed to exclude shareholder-submitted proposals under the rule if the shareholder proposes a say-on-pay vote with "substantially the same scope as the say-on-pay vote required by Rule 14a-21(a)." Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6020.
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shareholders' meeting. 62 In addition, the SEC required that companies disclose-in the next year's CD&A-whether the board had considered the results of the shareholder say-on-pay vote as part of making its decisions about future pay levels and, if so, how the board did S0. 63 In its say-on-pay rulemaking, the SEC did not take a position on the say-on-pay debate. The agency neither expressed a view on the utility of say-on-pay nor whether say-on-pay would actually affect pay practices or levels.64
II. SHAREHOLDER SAY-ON-PAY VOTING IN 2011
In the 2011 proxy season, the inaugural year for the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay mandate, shareholders at over 2200 U.S. public companies voted on say-on-pay proposals submitted by management.
6 5 Commentators reported that shareholders showed strong support for existing pay practices. On average, say-on-pay votes garnered 91.2% support, 6 6 as over 70% of the companies conducting a say-on-pay vote garnered more than 90% support and over 90% of the companies garnered more than 70% support. "about 1.3 percent of the index," possibly based on shareholder concerns about pay for performance. 69 Overall, negative say-on-pay votes in 2011 were correlated with company share returns and CEO pay. 70 At all of the companies with failed say-on-pay votes in 2011, proxy advisory firms (particularly the ISS) had issued a negative voting recommendation. 71 But ISS voting recommendations did not always carry the day. There were far more negative ISS voting recommendations than failed say-on-pay votes. 72 While the ISS recommended negative say-on-pay votes at 276 companies (12.4% of the companies it reviewed) ,73 only 41 companies had a failed say-on-paythat is, about "86 percent of the companies that received a negative recommendation from ISS," actually received majority support for their say-on-pay proposals. What factors drove say-on-pay voting in the 2011 proxy season? To answer this question-and to understand the disparity between ISS voting recommendations and actual voting results-we conducted an empirical analysis of the influence of several important factors that could explain the differences in shareholder voting patterns across various firms. We focused on the relationship between shareholder voting and total stock returns, total CEO pay, and the growth in CEO pay, because they were identified as important Guidelines20110127.pdf. These guidelines generally tracked the five "global principles" identified by the ISS in evaluating pay programs: (1) providing a "pay-for-performance alignment";
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To conduct our Study, we acquired a commercial dataset compiled by ISS that included all voting results for the 2011 proxy season on say-on-pay proposals presented at Russell 3000 companies.
7 6 For each of these companies, we then collected company data on total stock returns, total CEO pay, and growth in CEO pay. 77 Although we received voting data for over 2600 companies, we only were able to obtain data on the relevant pay variables for 1497 firms, which we used as our final sample.
A. Effect of ISS Recommendations on Say-on-Pay Votes
Based on the results of our earlier research on say-on-pay voting before Dodd-Frank, 78 we sought in this Study to quantify the effect of ISS voting recommendations on shareholder say-on-pay voting behavior after Dodd-Frank. The results of our research on say-on-pay voting before Dodd-Frank indicated that ISS voting recommendations had a significant (though not necessarily decisive) effect on shareholder say-on-pay voting, with an ISS voting recommendation resulting in an approximately twenty-five percent swing in how shareholders voted. 79 Our pre-Dodd-Frank findings were consistent with those identified in a post-Dodd-Frank survey conducted by The Conference Board about how companies viewed ISS influence on say-on-pay votes. 80 According to that survey, "[a] large majority of companies (70.4 percent) reported that their compensation programs were influ- 76 ISS analysts read company proxy statements to collect this information by hand. 77 We used both the Compustat and ExecuComp databases to compile this information. As discussed in connection with Table 5 , see infra Part II.B.3 and infra note 96, we also collected data from these electronic databases to compute "excess pay," based on variable such as tenure of CEO, company sales, company return on assets, company book value, company market value, company stock price, and S&P 500 market price. The majority of companies determine in advance whether their executive compensation programs are likely to receive a favorable recommendation from ISS or Glass Lewis; and companies are likely to make changes to a program in anticipation of a negative recommendation from these firms. All areas of the compensation program are affected, including disclosure, guidelines, and plan structure and design-although the degree to which these areas are affected varies considerably. 82 For these reasons, we begin our empirical analysis of say-on-pay during the 2011 proxy season by looking at the relationship between ISS voting recommendations and actual shareholder voting.
As Table 1 below shows, of the 1497 ISS say-on-pay recommendations in our sample, the ISS issued an "against" recommendation 173 times (11.6% of the time). We can calculate a measure of how an ISS "against" recommendation impacts "for" votes by subtracting (1) the average percentage of "for" votes when the ISS gives a positive recommendation from (2) the average percentage of "against" votes when the ISS gives a negative recommendation. This difference is 28.2%-a crude measure of the "ISS effect. However, a negative ISS recommendation does not necessarily mean that the company will get less than majority support for its sayon-pay proposal. In fact, we find that in only thirty-one cases in our sample did companies "fail" their vote, by getting less than fifty percent approval from shareholders. In the other 142 cases where the ISS gave a negative recommendation, shareholders still gave at least majority support for the company's proposal. Even though a negative ISS recommendation was not sufficient for a company to fail its sayon-pay vote, such a recommendation appeared necessary for a failed vote.
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We also looked at how ISS recommendations affected shareholder voting on the frequency with which companies proposed to conduct their say-on-pay votes. Table 2 below shows that ISS almost always recommended in favor of annual say-on-pay votes and that shareholders strongly supported annual voting. Overall, shareholders at 1347 companies in our sample (by majority or plurality vote) supported annual say-on-pay voting, compared with shareholders at only 123 companies supporting triennial voting. In other words, say-on-pay promises to be an annual event at most larger public companies.
depending on whether the ISS gives a positive or negative recommendation. Here, the ISS effect is 28.2%.
The ISS effect we find in the post-Dodd-Frank period is somewhat higher than the ISS effect we found for say-on-pay votes in the pre-Dodd-Frank period, where we found a 19.0% ISS effect when the ISS gives a "for" recommendation. Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1245 tbl.4. Again, ISS recommendations were influential (but not decisive) in how shareholders voted on the frequency question. At 377 companies in our sample where management recommended biennial or triennial say-on-pay voting, shareholders voted consistently with the ISS recommendation for annual voting in 254 of the companies. Yet at 123 companies (8.2% of our sample), shareholders adopted biennial or triennial voting despite an ISS recommendation for annual voting.
B. Effect of Other Factors on Say-on-Pay Voting
What other factors-besides an ISS recommendation-affected shareholder say-on-pay voting in the 2011 proxy season? We used our dataset to test for three factors widely identified by the ISS, commentators, and other studies as driving say-on-pay-namely, company stock performance, growth in CEO pay levels, and "excess" CEO pay.
Effect of "Total Stock Return"
The ISS and The Conference Board have both identified pay-forperformance issues as a principal reason for negative shareholder sayon-pay votes. 84 According to the ISS's 2011 U.S. Postseason Report, of the companies it examined, "[a]lmost half of the failed-vote firms have reported double-digit negative three-year total shareholder returns." 85 In the same report, ISS noted (though not as prominently) 84 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 7 (explaining that "pay-for-performance concerns" 
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the relevance of other compensation issues-"such . . . as tax grossups, discretionary bonuses, inappropriate peer benchmarking ... and failure to address significant opposition to compensation committee members in the past."
86
Given the importance that shareholders seemed to attach to company performance in their say-on-pay voting, we looked at how company total stock returns ("TSR") (defined as the cumulative raw return of the company's stock in the twenty-four months prior to Fiscal Year End 2010) and ISS recommendations correlated with shareholder votes. As Table 3 shows, TSR is a strong predictor of say-onpay voting-strong TSRs correlate with high levels of shareholder support and weak TSRs correlate with low levels of shareholder support.
8 7 We group companies in our Study by quintile based on their TSR over two years, with the weakest performers in Group 1 and the strongest in Group 5. We see that a negative ISS recommendation has the biggest impact for Group 1 (the weakest TSR quintile), where sayon-pay proposals received only 62.8% average voting support, compared to Group 5 (the strongest TSR quintile), where the proposals averaged 68.9% voting support. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 86 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 7. A publication examining "the first 100 proxy filings by Fortune 500 companies . . . subject to shareholder advisory votes under [Dodd-Frank]" by The Conference Board claimed that such other matters did not have a large impact on shareholder votes. Miller & Assayag, supra note 84, at 1, 5. The publication noted that "[a] study of four compensation practices . . .-excise tax gross-ups, perquisites, stock ownership guidelines, and clawbacks-indicates that [say-on-pay) votes for companies with those pay practices did not significantly differ from companies without them." Id. at 5. The study later acknowledged, however, that "when combined with other shareholder concerns (such as a pay and performance disconnect), there is the potential for these practices to swing the vote." Id. 87 See SUBODH .. , ., and * represent a t-test of the difference between the lowest and highest stock return groups for the percentage of "for" votes at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
88
The total stock return is the cumulative raw return of the company's stock in the twentyfour months prior to Fiscal Year End 2010.
Thus, TSR had a small (but statistically significant) effect when the ISS gave a "for" voting recommendation, with shareholders giving 2.0% more voting support for pay at companies with the highest TSRs than for pay at companies with the lowest TSRs. In addition, a larger effect (also statistically significant) was present when the ISS gave an "against" recommendation, with shareholders giving 6.1% higher support for pay at high-TSR companies than for pay at low-TSR companies. In short, TSR had an effect on shareholder say-on-pay voting, although less than that of the ISS recommendation.
Our finding that short-term TSR performance was a factor in shareholder voting support, but was not outcome determinative, is borne out by other studies. For example, an Equilar study of say-onpay in 2011 found that "among those companies receiving greater than 90 percent approval, over 20 percent still had a bottom-quartile TSR ranking." 9 Nonetheless, performance results were important, as demonstrated by the figure below from the Equilar study, which shows a "distribution of companies by performance that fall into each voting bracket for one-year total shareholder return": 90 
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Effect of CEO Pay Growth
Other studies of say-on-pay voting suggest that increases in CEO pay may have been important in say-on-pay voting. 92 In addition, proxy advisory firms have considered one-year pay growth in analyzing pay practices, recommending negative votes more often at companies with above average CEO pay increases than at those with belowaverage CEO pay increases. 93 In Table 4 , we show the effect of CEO pay growth on shareholder say-on-pay support. 94 Companies with the highest rates of CEO pay growth are in Group 5, while those with the lowest rates of growth are in Group 1. Overall, these results show that higher growth rates are associated with lower levels of shareholder support. The differences are statistically significant at the 5% level when ISS makes a "for" recommendation, but the differences are not markedly different (nor statistically significant) when the ISS makes an "against" recommendation.
91 This Figure is a reproduction of a figure appearing in Based on these univariate results, CEO pay growth does not appear to have as decisive an effect on shareholder say-on-pay voting as some have said. Although CEO pay growth had a negative effect on say-on-pay votes, this happened only when the ISS gave a "for" voting recommendation. Specifically, in the face of a positive ISS voting recommendation, shareholders gave 7.3% less voting support in the highest pay-growth companies compared to the lowest pay-growth companies. But when the ISS gave an "against" voting recommendation, there was no statistically significant difference in the voting results, although there was about a 3.6% lower average vote at companies with high levels of growth of CEO pay compared to companies with low levels of growth of CEO pay. In short, shareholders seemed less focused on CEO pay growth compared to company TSR.
Effect of "Excess" CEO Pay
Commentators and studies have identified perceived "excess" in CEO pay-that is, pay above the level predicted by a variety of variables-as a factor in say-on-pay voting. 95 In Table 5 , we examine the effect of "excess" CEO pay levels on shareholder support. Excess CEO pay attempts to measure the difference between actual pay levels and expected pay levels, based on an estimated value using several variables. 96 We see in Table 5 that panies with the highest levels of excess CEO pay also receive the lowest levels of shareholder say-on-pay support. The differences between the first and the fifth quintiles are statistically significant at the 1% level for "for" votes, but again (as with growth of CEO pay) not markedly different for "against" votes. Average Support 92.61% 64.36% "'represents a t-test of the difference between the lowest and highest "excess" CEO pay groups for the percentage of "for" votes at the 1% level of significance.
Like TSR and CEO pay growth, excess CEO pay is a factor in shareholder say-on-pay voting-but only when the ISS gives a "for" recommendation. For companies with the highest "excess" CEO pay, shareholders give 7.3% less support than for companies with the least "excess" CEO pay-an effect much smaller than for an ISS voting recommendation.
In short, our univariate analysis demonstrates that an ISS "against" recommendation seems to dominate shareholder say-on-pay voting, overshadowing the effects of TSR, CEO pay growth, and excess CEO pay. Only when the ISS gives a "for" recommendation do shareholders do their own homework and withdraw some of their vot- , and is equal to the natural logarithm ("log") of total compensation minus expected log (compensation), where expected log (compensation) is estimated by regressing log (total compensation) on a series of independent variables for the full sample, which include log (tenure of executive), log (sales), S&P 500 return, book-to-market ratio, stock return in 2010, stock return in 2009, return on assets in 2010, return on assets in 2009, and industry control indicator variables, see id. at 11-12. The value for expected log (total compensation) is the residual using the parameter estimates from the regression applied to each firm. See id. at 12.
ing support when a company has high TSR, high CEO pay growth, or high CEO excess pay.
C. Multivariate Analysis: Sorting out Factors
Given the apparent strength of an ISS say-on-pay recommendation, particularly when it is negative, we next seek to sort out the relevance of the factors examined in Tables 3, 4 , and 5 (total stock returns, growth of CEO pay, and "excess" CEO pay) and to sort out their individual strengths compared to the impact of an ISS "against" recommendation.
In Table 6 , we show the results of an ordinary least-squares linear regression on the variables identified in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 97 In particular, we used the percentage vote on say-on-pay frequency as the dependent variable and looked at the following independent variables: (1) negative ISS recommendation, (2) excess CEO pay, (3) percentage change in CEO pay, and (4) an interaction term for companies that are both in the highest quintile for excess pay and the lowest quintile for total stock return (that is, the worst performing companies with the most excessively-paid CEOs).
We find that all of these independent variables are negative factors in say-on-pay votes and statistically significant, except for percentage change in CEO pay, which was insignificant. However, we also find (as our univariate analysis suggested) that an ISS "against" recommendation is much more relevant to shareholder voting than the "excess" pay and combined low TSR/high excess pay factorseven dwarfing them in predictive value. -53 (1971) . In this case, we are measuring the impact of an ISS "against" recommendation on say-on-pay voting, and we find that an ISS "against" recommendation decreases the percentage of "for" votes on the say-on-pay proposal by 26.7%. , ", and ***represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
These results support the conclusion that shareholders seemed to be influenced in their first year of say-on-pay voting by an ISS "against" recommendation far more than shareholders' own analysis of whether the company was an outlier in terms of high overall pay or low total stock returns compared to the company's industry or peers. This analysis suggests that the ISS may be identifying the principal factors that shareholders find relevant in their say-on-pay votes-or that shareholders believe the ISS has done this for them.
The analysis also suggests that shareholders on their ownthough to a lesser extent than the ISS-identify some outlier companies based on their independent analysis of "excess" pay and its inter-98 In a linear regression, the intercept is a constant representing the value of the independent variable (defined in supra note 97) irrespective of the impact of the dependent variables. See KMENTA, supra note 97, at 5. When other dependent variables are added to the regression, the impact of their addition is measured by the coefficient listed in each table. See generally id. at 347-50. An indicator variable is a variable that is either 0 or 1 depending on whether the binary variable is a yes or no. See id. at 409-10, 425-48. In this case, ISS either favors a say-on-pay proposal (indicator is 1) or opposes the proposal (indicator is 0). The coefficient then measures the impact of ISS favoring a proposal versus opposing the proposal. An interaction variable is a combination of two variables. See id. at 418-19. If ISS favors a proposal and the company's executive is highly paid, the interaction variable would be a 1 and a 0 otherwise. 99 ISS Recommendation is an indicator variable that is 1 if the ISS recommends against the proposal.
100 "Excess Pay" is computed using the methodology of John E. Core et al., supra note 96. 101 "Percentage Change in Pay" is a variable calculated by ExecuComp that represents the change in total compensation to the CEO of each firm scaled by total cash compensation in the 102 "Lowest TSR Rank * Highest Excess Pay Rank" is an interaction variable that is 1 if a firm's twenty-four-month stock price return is in the lowest quintile and the firm's CEO's excess pay is in the highest quintile. action with TSR. Interestingly, the claim that growth in CEO pay has independent predictive value in identifying outlier companies (something suggested in our univariate analysis) is not supported by our multivariate analysis of the data. In all, the ISS identification of outlier companies through an "against" voting recommendation and the further identification of outliers by shareholders (beyond that contained in a negative ISS recommendation) based on a combination of company "excess" pay and company TSR seem to explain how sayon-pay was used in its inaugural year to identify and discipline pay practices at outlier firms.
Nonetheless, the factors we looked at were less than fully explanatory of say-on-pay voting in the first year under Dodd-Frank. The strength of a negative ISS recommendation was clear, but not completely explanatory of say-on-pay voting. Additional tested factorslow TSR (poor stock performance) and combined low performance/ excess pay-were relatively weaker in explaining shareholder say-onpay voting. In short, it appears there may be other factors neither identified by our analysis nor suggested by others that may also be important in shareholders' voting decisions.
III. SAY-ON-PAY IN 2012 PROXY SEASON
Some commentators have described the 2011 proxy season as a watershed event in U.S. corporate governance. They have concluded that mandatory say-on-pay voting under Dodd-Frank brought about greater management attention to shareholder concerns generally, increased shareholder interest in voting on corporate governance, and catalyzed a broader shareholder-management dialogue on pay issues-a dialogue that included proxy advisory firms. 0 3 As one sayon-pay proponent explained:
(a) say-on-pay brings greater attention to executive pay policies and practices; (b) shareholders feel more connected with the process of setting executive pay .. .; and (c) directors and management give increased attention to whether executive pay is consistent with shareholders' views. [Vol. 81:967
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But say-on-pay voting during the 2011 proxy season did not lead, as some had predicted, to a widespread shareholder backlash against increasing levels of executive pay. Although the ISS evaluated sayon-pay proposals, in part, based on whether inappropriate "peer group benchmarking" had been "used to set target pay or award opportunities," 0 the upward spiral in CEO pay seemed not to be on the minds of most shareholders.
10 6 Our analysis demonstrates that growth in CEO pay was not a strong factor in explaining negative say-on-pay votes.
107
As interesting as say-on-pay voting was during the 2011 proxy season, the aftermath of the first year of say-on-pay has been perhaps more interesting. We next look at commentary on say-on-pay before and during the 2012 proxy season. We then examine how say-on-pay has affected recent pay practices-and corporate governance dynamics-at four targeted companies. We find that say-on-pay in 2011 appears to have been the beginning of a trend in which the ISS and institutional shareholders have taken a much larger role in setting the agenda for executive pay in U.S. companies.
A. Getting Ready for Say-On-Pay in 2012: Aftermath of 2011
Companies during the first proxy season of say-on-pay in 2011 awoke to the new realities of shareholder interest in executive pay. Generally, companies responded with increased (and different) disclosures and became proactive in the face of a negative ISS voting recommendation. Shareholders also behaved differently, paying attention to new company outreach and focusing their attention on the say-on-pay vote rather than other avenues to communicate their views on pay practices. The failure by companies to address shareholder concerns, sometimes leading to a failed say-on-pay vote, often resulted in litigation. Proxy advisors took note of these developments, schooling their company clients on how to avoid say-on-pay failure.
Company Responses to Say-on-Pay in 2011
Even before say-on-pay voting began during the 2011 proxy season, management at many companies changed the substance and dis-closure of their pay programs. 108 According to a study by The Conference Board on pay practices at the first 100 companies in the Fortune 500 to file their 2011 proxy filings, many of these companies revised their pay programs, particularly to more clearly align pay with performance.1 09 Many companies also changed their CD&A disclosures of executive pay filed with annual meeting proxy materials. 110 In addition, some companies before the 2011 proxy season revised their executive pay programs by "minimizing non-performancebased pay" ("such as tax gross-ups, executive perquisites and large severance arrangements") or improving the relationship between pay and performance."' According to The Conference Board, forty-six percent of the companies in their study "eliminated [or reduced] nonperformance-based pay elements" in anticipation of the 2011 say-onpay vote.11 2 The Conference Board found that six companies improved the pay-for-performance relationship with changes to company guidelines on CEO stock ownership 13 and thirty-four others revised standards for "clawbacks" (restitution) of executive pay after a financial restatement.1 14 Also before say-on-pay voting during the 2011 proxy season, many companies revised their proxy disclosure of executive pay, seeking to make the disclosure not only compliant, but also informative and persuasive. 34 recently adopted or enhanced these provisions").
Id.
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graphical representations.11 6 Some companies went so far as to include a summary at the beginning of the proxy statement that emphasized pay determinations and firm performance in 2010.117
Company (and Shareholder) Responses to Negative ISS Recommendations in 2011
A remarkable aspect of the 2011 proxy season was the give and take that occurred at companies that received negative say-on-pay recommendations by the proxy advisory firms. Rather than counting on shareholder loyalty, management at these companies entered into a direct dialogue with shareholders following the "against" recommendation.118
As one commentator noted, "With additional pressure from proxy-advisory firm recommendations, the new law has led many companies to increase their communication with shareholders and reevaluate their compensation and corporate-governance practices."119 In addition, some companies receiving a negative recommendation filed supplemental proxy disclosures "in large part to defend their pay-for-performance orientation," 120 including "slideshow presentations," "letters to proxy advisory firms .. . tak [ing] issue with the accuracy of the information cited in the reports or disagreeing with the analysis," and "letters to shareholders."121 Management engagement with shareholders seemed to bear fruit. Many companies that responded to an ISS "against" recommendation with additional disclosure eventually received a favorable say-on-pay vote.1 22 Yet some companies that received negative say-on-pay recommendations during the 2011 proxy season "were unprepared and were unable to quickly ramp up their shareholder outreach."1 23 The com- 116 Id. For example, some companies included "a comparison of total shareholder return (TSR) vs. CEO pay at the beginning of the CD&A," possibly anticipating a pending requirement under new SEC rules. Id. at 3. Other companies included in the CD&A comparisons of company TSR with "the TSR of an index and peers over a multiyear period"-something already required under Form 10-K. panies were often advised that they could "be at risk" of a future unfavorable recommendation or vote and should "hone their messaging and outreach strategy well in advance of next year's annual meeting. "124 Reviewing the aftermath of the 2011 proxy season, the ISS commented that say-on-pay seemed to have changed the shareholdermanagement dialogue, with shareholders resorting less often in 2011 to "no" or "withhold" votes on directors. 125 In other words, rather than express displeasure with executive pay by voting against particular directors, shareholders used the say-on-pay vote to voice their opinions about pay practices.
This explanation of the 2011 proxy season was substantiated by the results of director elections. As some commentators noted, directors up for election in 2011 were "re-elected with the highest average level of shareholder support in the last five years."1 26 While ninetyone directors in 2010 and ninety-three directors in 2009 failed to receive majority shareholder backing, the number of directors failing to receive such support in 2011 dropped to forty-five.1 27 To the extent that shareholders voted against individual directors, reasons other than membership on a controversial compensation committee dominated their reasons for not reelecting directors, including "poor meeting attendance," "failure to put a poison pill to a shareholder vote," and "failure to implement majority-supported shareholder resolutions." 128 Nonetheless, this diversion of shareholder attention during the 2011 proxy season away from directors did not happen for directors on the compensation committees at companies with failed say-on-pay votes. In one study, such directors "received, on average, 13.5% fewer votes in favor than the other directors on the ballot." 129 By con-124 Id.; see also Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 1, at 1259. 125 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 14. This pattern was in line with ISS voting guidelines for 2011, which called on shareholders to express "dissatisfaction with compensation practices . .. by voting against [management's say-on-pay proposal] rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee." 2011 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 75, at 37. But when management did not offer a say-on-pay proposal, the ISS suggested that a "negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee." Id. 
Shareholder Litigation Following Failed 2011 Say-on-Pay Votes
Dodd-Frank specifically disclaimed that its say-on-pay regime established new fiduciary duties for corporate directors. Even so, failed say-on-pay votes during the 2011 proxy season nevertheless spawned shareholder suits.
2
Of the firms with a failed say-on-pay vote in 2011, at least nine were targeted in lawsuits alleging breaches of director fiduciary duties and corporate waste. 133 However, the proportion of firms sued after a failed say-on-pay vote in 2011 was lower than in 2010, when "two of the three negative say-on-pay votes resulted in derivative actions." 134 These actions generally have claimed that the company in question "violated its 'pay for performance' philosophy" and that company directors violated their fiduciary duties by "disregard[ing] the negative advisory shareholder [say-on-pay] vote in failing to rescind the increased executive compensation." such lawsuits would be dismissed as frivolous-which has happenedat least one court has denied a motion to dismiss,1 36 leading to questions about the "protection of the business judgment rule" in such cases. 137 Fear of litigation following a failed say-on-pay vote led corporate advisors after the 2011 proxy season to recommend that companies change the "CEO performance evaluation process," and "position the company more favorably" to avoid a negative vote or "to defend against such a lawsuit."1 38 Directors have also been advised to "be especially sensitive to the deliberative process leading up to pay decisions and the way in which that process is documented." 13 9 Not only have directors at companies with failed say-on-pay votes been sued, but so too have "outside compensation consultants" for allegedly "aid[ing] and abett [ing] [director] breaches of the duty of loyalty" as well as purportedly breaching their consulting agreements. 140 This risk may in turn lead to higher consulting fees and "stronger indemnification provisions" in consulting agreements with at-risk clients.141
B. Say-on-Pay in 2012: Early Results
The predictions and cautions that came after the 2011 proxy season proved to be spot-on in the 2012 proxy season. Commentators examining preliminary results early in the 2012 season have made several important observations: (1) most companies targeted by the ISS in 2011 had mostly eliminated "egregious" pay practices, including excessive executive perquisites, "'golden parachute' payment tax gross ups," and undue severance pay;1 42 (2) companies have been engaging with shareholders through increased disclosure in their CD&A statements; (3) companies have used extra solicitation materials in reply to unfavorable ISS recommendations; (4) more firms have been making "preemptive changes to compensation policies and practices" following consultations with their shareholders and proxy voting advisors; and (5) there are increasing levels of communications between compa- Regarding board-level communications, the survey found: Many directors increased communications with stakeholders during the last year in response to the desire of various corporate constituencies for more dialogue with board members. The largest increase is seen in communications with employees (36%), while 31% report an increase in communications with major shareholders. Just over one-quarter (26%) report an increase in communications with analysts. As additional evidence supporting the evolution of boards' communication policies, nearly half (47%) of directors say the board should have a role in communicating governance issues to major shareholders, and one-third (33%) indicate the board should communicate governance issues to proxy advisory firms, as well as employees.1 Mr. Lopez may only terminate his employment agreement "for good reason" in the event of a change of control if there is also a material reduction in the nature or scope of his duties, responsibilities, authority, or position, including, but not limited to, removal or expulsion from the Board of Directors without Cause, as such term is defined within such agreement. These changes removed the "modified single trigger" mechanism referred to in the Report.1 76
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At the company's annual meeting on March 15, 2012, Shuffle Master's shareholders voted in favor of its say-on-pay proposal with an 86.4% vote. 177 This case illustrates how a company responded to a failed say-on-pay vote in 2011, in the end garnering strong shareholder support in the 2012 say-on-pay vote.
Case 2: Disney
The Walt Disney Company is one of the largest publicly-traded companies in America 1 7 s and also one of the highest-paying.1 79 The company trades on the New York Stock Exchange (DIS) and in 2012 had a market capitalization of approximately $92 billion. 80 In its 2011 proxy filing, Disney revealed that the employment agreements for its top executives contained tax gross-ups in the event of a change in control. 181 Following the filing of the Disney proxy materials, ISS issued a report urging shareholders to vote against the pay packages to top Disney executives.
the say-on-pay vote at its annual meeting, the company eliminated the gross-up provisions from the executives' employment agreements.1 84 In its 2012 proxy filing, Disney did not admit (as had Shuffle Master) that the negative ISS recommendation was most likely responsible for the negative feedback it received from shareholders, but it did say this:
Fiscal 2011 Decisions The following is a discussion of specific decisions made by the Compensation Committee in fiscal year 2011 or with respect to fiscal year 2011 compensation for the named executive officers. In making its decisions, the Committee considered specific comments received from shareholders. In particular, in connection with the advisory vote on executive compensation to be presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting, the Company received feedback from the Company's shareholder base regarding its practice of providing tax protection for certain executives who are subject to excise taxes on compensation received on termination following a change in control. In light of this feedback and considering evolving market practices, the Compensation Committee, prior to the 2011 Annual Meeting, adopted a policy that it will not, without shareholder approval, include reimbursement for excise taxes payable by an executive upon termination following a change in control in any future agreements with executive officers, and no agreement with executive officers contains such a provision at this time. Except where the Committee received specific feedback from shareholders, the Committee did not speculate as to the motivations behind the advisory vote, which, with approximately 77% of shares present and eligible to vote approving the resolution, the Committee considered to be generally favorable. 85 As the 2012 proxy materials indicate, Disney's preemptive revision of its executives' employment agreements resulted in a 77% shareholder advisory approval of the revised pay packages.1 86 This is an example of a company responding quickly to shareholder concerns and as a result obtaining a favorable outcome on its say-on-pay vote.
